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Summary
:
This paper adapts the vintage model of urban housing developed in Brueckner
(1979) to a two-class city. Computer simulation of the model highlights
the differences between static and dynamic urban areas. The contour of
building heights in irregular in the dynamic city and spatial mixing of the
two income groups occurs.
Residential Succession and Land-Use Dynamics
in a Vintage Model of Urban Housing
by
Jan K. Brueckner
I.
In the static urban spatial model, different income groups live
segregated in doughnut-shaped annular areas, with the poorer groups liv-
ing closer to the center of the city. This result follows from the in-
verse relationship between the steepness of a group's bid-rent curve for
housing and its income level. The reasoning is that the only way each
bid-rent curve can be maximal in some part of the city, so that all in-
come groups are represented in the urban population, is for the steepest
curve to be maximal in the central part of the city, the next steepest
to be maximal in an adjacent annulus, and so on. For a rigorous discus-
sion of static multi-class cities, see Hartwick et. al . (1976).
Although the standard model generates complete segregation by income,
real world location patterns are far less neat. While many studies show
positive correlations between income and distance to the central business
district (CBD), casual observation at the neighborhood level often pro-
vides evidence of substantial spatial mixing of different income groups,
contrary to the predictions of the model.
Partly in order to generate location patterns which conform better
to reality, this paper adapts the vintage model of urban housing developed
in Brueckner (1979) to a two-class city. One of the principal insights
afforded by computer simulation of the model is that spatial mixing of
different income groups is a likely occurrence when the durability of
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housing is recognized. Furthermore, the simulation results illustrate
that residential succession, where dwellings are bid away from their
original inhabitants, can lead to spatial patterns of land-use intensity
which are strikingly different from those predicted by the static model.
Erratic patterns of building heights which recapitulate actual cities
replace the smoothly declining contour of building heights predicted
by the static model.
The vintage model used in this paper constitutes an improvement over
previous models of durable housing (see Muth (1973) , Anas (1978) , and
Fisch (1977) , for example) because of its simplicity and its explicitly
spatial character. The tractability of the model is largely due to the
assumptions of housing producer myopia (current prices are expected to
persist forever) and the exogeneity of utility (the city is open and
costless migration equates the urban utility level to the exogenous ex-
ternal level). The next section of the paper reviews the structure of
the vintage model for a one-class city, while Section III generalizes
the model to include two income groups. Section IV contains the simu-
lation results, and Section V presents conclusions.
II.
Precisely stated, the fundamental assumptions of the model are that
the utility level of urban residents is given by an exogenous function
of time, u(t) , and that housing producers expect the price per unit of
housing services in their structures at all future times to equal the
current price. It is also assumed that structural modification of build-
ings and their dwellings is possible only through demolition and rede-
velopment. Quality deterioration, however, causes the amount of services
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provided by a dwelling to decline at a constant percentage rate a during
its life.
The open city assumption means that v(x,q) = u(t) , where v is the
quasi-concave utility function for the identical urban residents, x is
the consumption of the numeraire non-housing good, and q is the consump-
tion of housing services. Inverting this equation yields x = x(q,u(t)),
which, for a given q, gives the consumption level of the numeraire which
generates utility equal to u(t) . Substituting for x in the consumer bud-
get constraint, the price per unit of housing services which allows the
consumer to reach utility level u(t) in a dwelling with service level q
located k miles from the CBD is given by
p .
y(t) - c(t,k) - x(q,u(t))
g G(t)k>q) p (1)
where y(t) is exogenous income at time t and c(t,k) is commuting cost
from k to the CBD at t. Let p(t,k) = max G(t,k,q) be the maximum achiev-
able price per unit of housing services at t and k, and let q(t,k) be the
dwelling size which calls forth this price. It is easily shown that the
budget line x + p(t,k)q + c(t,k) = y(t) is tangent to the indifference
curve with utility level u(t) at the point where q = q(t,k).
With myopia, the housing producer expects the price per unit of hous-
ing services in new structures to persist indefinitely. Therefore, the
producer divides a structure built k miles from the CBD at time t into
dwellings of size q(t,k), which yield the maximum price per unit of ser-
vices at t. To construct the building, the producer purchases inputs
of land I and non-land capital N, which yield housing services accord-
ing to the constant returns function H(N,£). Now since the price per unit
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of services in the new building is expected to persist forever, the ex-
pected present value of revenue for the building is higher the longer
the anticipated operating period. Thus the producer assumes the building
will have an infinite life, and accordingly arranges to finance his con-
struction cost over an infinite period. With constant returns, the scale
of output is indeterminate, but housing producers choose S, the N/£
ratio in structures, by maximizing the expected present value of profit
(EPVP) per acre. At time t, EPVP per acre is given by
P(t
;+r
h(S)
-
n(t)S
-
R(t
'
k)
' (2)
where r is the discount rate, n(t) is the exogenous unit price of N at t,
R(t,k) is the endogenous land price per acre at t and k, and h(S) = H(S,1).
Equation (2) comes from integrating p(t,k)h(S)e - rn(t)S - rR(t,k)
,
t«-- • -11111- r —r ( to— t)
expected profits per acre at time w, weighted by the discount factor e
,
from co=t to w =c°. Euler's theorem makes the maximized value of (2) equal to
zero and allows R(t,k) to be solved for in terms of p(t,k), n(t) , a, and r.
To implement the model, it is assumed that production and utility func-
tions are Cobb-Douglas, H(N,J£) = N I and v(x,q) = x q , and that utility
income, and commuting costs are given by u(t) = u„e , y(t) = yne , and
c(t,k) = c r|k-e • Note that the last two assumptions give y(t) - c(t,k) =
(y
r)
-c„k)e . Using (1), the assumptions yield
v _c k _i_ 2=Ht
p(t,k) = (1-6)9 ( ) e (3)
u
and yield a similar solution for q(t,k). The price per unit of services
in new dwellings decreases with k and increases (decreases) over time as
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the rate of increase of income is greater than (less than) the rate of in-
crease of utility. The further assumption n(t) = n„e yields solutions
for R(t,k) and S , the optimal value of S in (2).
tk
A central feature of the model is that the myopia of housing pro-
ducers is never validated. The price per unit of services beyond a con-
struction date x does not remain equal to p(x,k) in general. The actual
price at t in dwellings constructed at time T at distance k is denoted
f (t,k;x) and is given by
f(t,k;x) = G(t,k,q(T,k)e~a(t
"T)
) (4)
Note that f(r,k;x) = p(x,k).
Although producer myopia means that the anticipated lifespan of a
new structure is infinite, producers may demolish their buildings and re-
develop at a finite time. If the EPVP per acre from continuing to operate
a building falls short of the EPVP per acre from clearing the original land
and constructing a new building, then the producer redevelops. Note that
if redevelopment occurs, the producer must continue to amortize the cost
of the non-land capital in the original structure, which is destroyed with
demolition. When demolition costs are zero, the above condition for the
desirability of redevelopment translates into the compact condition
f(t,k;x) h(S ) , .
R(t,k)> ££ — e aU T\ (5)
which says that redevelopment of structures of vintage x located at k
is desirable at t if land's resale price per acre equals or exceeds the
expected present value of revenue (EPVll) per acre from continuing to
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operate the structures. Note that h(S
,
)e is the output of hous-tk
ing services per acre at t from structures of vintage t located at k and
that the producer expects the price per unit of housing services to equal
f(t,k;t) in all future periods. Substituting in (5) for R(t,k), f(t,k;x),
and h(S ) using the above assumptions on functional forms yields the
following condition for determining the demolition age z of structures:
(l-6)(l-g)exp[(C+B)z]
, ,.
1-6 expt- ^p- Bz]
o
where C = (P(y-u-n(l-0))/(l-B) (1-0)) + a and B = ((Oy-u) /(1-0)) - a.
Note that if a demolition age exists, it is independent of a structure's
construction date T and location k. A unique positive solution to (6)
exists as long as C > 0. If C
_< 0, certain values of B exist for which
(6) has no positive solutions; buildings deteriorate indefinitely in
these cases.
It is interesting to note that relaxing the assumption of zero demo-
lition costs introduces the possibility of building abandonment. Abandon-
ment occurs when no consumer will live in a building at a positive price;,
or f (t,k;x)
_< 0. To see that abandonment can never occur when demolition
costs are zero, note that the positivity of R(t,k) in (5) means that (5)
will be first satisfied while f(t,k;x) is still positive; redevelopment
will occur before abandonment. If demolition costs per acre, D(t), are
positive, however, the appropriate LHS for (5) is R(t,k) - D(t) , and it
is possible that f(t,k;x) turns negative before (5) is satisfied, implying
that abandonment may occur before redevelopment.
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In Brueckner (1978) , the model sketched in this section was used to
explore the spatial growth of an urban area over time. In the next sec-
tion, the model is adapted to a city with two income classes.
III.
In order to avoid consideration of the spatial growth of the city in
the following analysis, the outer urban boundary is assumed to be fixed
over time. This follows from assuming that the price of agricultural land
changes at the same rate as the price of urban land at the outer boundary.
In the two-class model, both income groups have the utility function
ft
"1
_Q
x q , and utility, income, and commuting costs for the groups are
.u.t.y.t.y.t ..y.t
U e
3
' y e
D
' °0ke ^ ' i=1 ' 2 » yieldin§ Y±(t) ~ c ± (t,k) = (yQ-c^k)e
X
,
i=l,2.
The location of the areas in which new construction for the groups
occurs is considered first. Suppose an entire open city is constructed
at t=0. At each distance, housing will be built for the group willing to
pay the highest price per unit of housing services for new units. Noting
(3) , housing is constructed for group 1 at k if
y01 ~ C01k
>
yQ2 " C02k .
u u
01 02
and for group 2 if the reverse inequality holds. Now both sides of (7)
are downward-sloping straight lines with at most one intersection. If
both groups are to live in the city, the value of k at the intersection
must be positive and must yield positive values for both sides of (7)
.
Under these conditions, it is easily shown that initially, group 1 lives
in an outer annulus and group 2 lives in an inner annulus only if
y01
.
y02
> -^ (8)
c c
01 02
while the opposite is true if the reverse inequality holds. Thus the
group with the highest value of yf)/c lives in an outer annulus at time
1
zero.
Although all construction is simultaneous in the original city, it
will become clear below that subsequent redevelopment of buildings need
not occur simultaneously, even in the case of buildings constructed at
the same date for a particular group. Recall that in the one-class model,
buildings constructed at the same date were always redeveloped simultan-
eously. Nonetheless, if any new construction for group i occurs at time
t, the new buildings will be located at distances where p.(t,«) is
maximal. Accordingly, the "new-construction area" for group i at t is
defined to be the set of values of k for which p.(t,*) is maximal.
Now p^tjk) < p 2 (t,k) as u02 (y01-c0][ k)exp[ (.Yj-^j) t] < uQ1 (y02-c02k)exp[ (y2~u2)t]
,
using (3), and it may be shown that p 1 (t,*) and p„(t,*) are maximal in an
outer and an inner annulus respectively when (8) holds, and vice versa when
the reverse inequality holds. The boundary between the annul! at t, k(t)
,
is found by equating the two sides of the above inequality. Note that if
A
y - u = y - u , k'(t) = 0. This discussion establishes that when
(8) holds, the new-construction area for group 1 (2) is an outer (inner)
annulus; any new building constructed at t for group 1 (2) will be located
A
beyond (inside of) k(t) . Finally, it is important to realize that there
will be many periods in the city's history where no new construction takes
place.
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While housing is originally constructed for the group which bids the
highest price per unit of services for new dwellings, changes in income
and utility levels, commuting costs, and dwelling service levels can gen-
erate residential succession, where one group out bids the other group for
dwellings originally constructed for it. In the two-class model, the
function G from (1) will be indexed by i. Letting w. (t,k;x) = q.(x,k)e
denote the service level at t in a dwelling originally constructed at t
and k for group i, the maximum price per unit of services that a member of
group j will pay to live in the dwelling is given by G. (t,k,w. (t,k;x))
.
The dwelling will be bid away from group i when this expression exceeds
f.(t,k;x) H G. (t,k,w. (t,k;x)) . Using (1), this requires
y (t) - c (t,k) - x(wi (t,k;x), u (t))
>
y
±
(t) - c
±
(t,k) - xCwiCt,k;T), u± (t)) (9)
Setting j=l and i=2 and using the solution for q.(x,k) and the maintained
assumption on functional forms, (9) reduces to
yoi "
c
oik (y2"yi )t:
-^ f±- > (1 - F(t,x)e
l X
) (10)
y02 02
2
where F is a complicated function which does not involve k. Similarly,
setting j=2 and i=l, (9) reduces to
> (1 + M(t,x))e * "" (11)
y02 I
C
02
k
. ,„ . „,. _„
(yr>
7
2
}t
yoi - coik
3
v;here M is another complicated function. Inequalities (10) and
(11) imply particular spatial patterns for residential succession. If
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y /c
ft
> y,
)
n/ c r
]
yy then the LKS of (10) is increasing in k, and thus, if
(10) is satisfied for some k' in the city, it also holds for all k > k'
.
This result implies that if members of group 1 are able at time t to bid
away any group 2 units of vintage t, these units will be the outermost
units of that vintage. Similarly, since the LHS of (11) is decreasing in
k when Yqi/Cq-i > yn2 /
' C02' if ^"^ holds for some k' , it holds for all
k < k' . This implies that if group 2 is able at time t to bid away any
group 1 units of vintage x, these units will be the innermost units of
that vintage. Since Yq-i/Cqi > yno^ c02 ^Plies that the new-construction
area for group 1 (2) is an outer (inner) annulus, the above results im-
ply that if a group is able to bid away any of the other group's units
of a particular vintage, these units will be the ones closest to the given
group's new-construction area. The same conclusion follows if
y /c < y _/c _. In this case group l's (2's) new-construction area
is an inner (outer) annulus, while units of the other group of a particu-
lar vintage which are bid away by group 1 (2) will be the innermost (outer-
most) units of that vintage. These facts are confirmed by the simulation
results reported in Section IV.
Using a non-spatial model, Muth (1973) reached conclusions which are
consistent with the above results. He showed that dwellings bid away from
the high-income group by the poor will be those which provide low levels
of housing services. Our model implies that if the poor live in the inner
annulus, dwellings of a given vintage which they bid away from the high-
income group will be those providing the lowest level of services for that
vintage. This follows because the service level of a group's dwellings
of a particular vintage increases with distance to the CBD and because the
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poor bid away only the innermost high-income dwellings of any vintage.
Empirical support for these conclusions is provided in Brueckner (1978)
,
where residential succession is shown to proceed most vigorously in areas
with "small" dwellings.
At this point it will be useful to sketch some possible residential
histories for the city. Suppose first that k' (t) = 0, so that the new
construction areas remain fixed over time. Then suppose that each group
is never able to bid away any of the other group's dwellings. In this
case, each annulus behaves as if it were described by the one-class model;
all the buildings in an annulus are redeveloped simultaneously at inter-
vals given by the solution to (6) based on the appropriate parameter
values. The length of these intervals will be different in general in
the two annuli. Residential succession, however, might occur while
k'(t) = 0. Although dwellings will be bid away from their original oc-
cupants, the fact that new-construction areas are fixed means that the
original occupant type always returns when buildings are redeveloped.
It will be shown below, however, that buildings which undergo succession
age beyond their normal demolition date. Finally, the new-construction
areas may change over time, and this may or may not be accompanied by
residential succession. Since the former case clearly involves the most
complicated dynamic process, the simulations below were chosen to illus-
trate it.
To conclude the analysis of the model, it is shown that a build-
ing which undergoes succession and is redeveloped for its original occu-
pants is redeveloped later than a building constructed at the same date
which does not undergo succession. If a building is built at t and k
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for group i and redeveloped for that group, redevelopment occurs when
R.(«,k) equals the EPVR per acre for the structure. If the building has
been bid away by group j , the EPVR per acre at t is given by
G (t,k,w (t,k;t)) h(s\)
_ ft _N
_J L_ SL. e «C t) f (12)
noting (5) . If succession has not occurred, the EPVR per acre at t
i —ex C t~T J
equals f.(t,k;r)h(S
,
)e /(a+r). Now if the building is occupied
1 TK.
by group j at t, then G. (t,k,w. (t,k;x)) > f.(t,k;x). This means that
(12) exceeds R.(*,k) at the no-succession redevelopment date, where the
second EPVR expression above equals R.(«,k). Thus the building is not
ready for redevelopment at the no-succession redevelopment date if resi-
dential succession has occurred. While this argument holds for fixed k,
it is also true when two buildings in different locations are compared.
Since buildings of the same vintage in different locations are redeveloped
at the same date when they do not undergo succession, it follows that a
building which undergoes succession is redeveloped later than another
building of the same vintage in a different location which does not.
This fact is amply illustrated in the simulations.
IV.
This section reports results for two selected simulations out of
the large number that were computed. In all the simulations, c = c - 1,
A
y = 150, y = 87.5, u = 2, and u = 1, which imply k(0) = 25 and
that new construction for the initially richer group always occurs in the
outer annulus. As in Brueckner (1978), a, the rate of deterioration of
structures, equals .01; 3, the exponent of N in the housing production
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function equals .75; 6, the exponent of the non-housing good in the utility
function, equals .6; and n, the rate of increase of the price of non-land
capital, equals zero. The city is divided into discrete rings one "block"
wide, with k at all points in each ring set equal to the outer radius of
the ring. The outer boundary of the city is fixed at k=65. It is also as-
sumed that new construction and changes of location by consumers occur
only at integer times.
The residential history of each ring was computed as follows. At
t=0, new structures were built for the appropriate group. At each subse-
quent time, the group with the highest bid for dwellings in the ring was
assigned to them, and the EPVR per acre was compared to the appropriate
land price (given by the identity of the new construction area in which
the ring is located). If redevelopment was warranted, new structures were
built for the appropriate group.
The tables below report, for selected times, four pieces of informa-
tion: OCC, the identity of the occupants of the buildings in each ring;
OROCC, the identity of the group for whom the buildings were originally
constructed; AGE, the age of the buildings; and S*, the log of a normal-
ized S value in each ring, which represents building height. S* was com-
puted by dividing S by its value at t=0 and k=0, multiplying by 100, and
taking the log. The reason for the normalization was to avoid having to
choose an arbitrary level for the price of N, n„, which sets the level of
S. For a structure of vintage t constructed for group i at distance k,
the buidling height measure is given by
-14-
^ i {
uo2%rcoik\ , r (yrui ) . M ,,
<k = 4 ' 605 + (i-e)Ci-B) lost y02 u . ^
+ [ (1-6) (1-3) ^ <13 >
Note that building heights change only when redevelopment occurs. Group bid
prices for the units in each ring and other potentially interesting quan-
tities are not reported to save space.
Our goal was to generate urban histories where residential succession
and changes in the new-construction areas of the groups occur together.
In the first simulation, V- = .08, y_ = .07, u = .079, and u„ = .066.
A
These assumptions imply k' (t) > 0, which says that the new-construction
areas for groups 1 and 2 shrink and grow respectively over time, and they
also generate dramatic residential succession in the group 1 new-construc-
tion area. Note that y > y„ and y_. > y_„ imply y (t) > y„(t) for all t,
and that since y.-u. > 0, i=l,2, building heights from (13) increase over
time. The length of the first simulation is 50 years.
The second simulation illustrates residential succession in the
group 2 new-construction area. To generate this outcome under the re-
quirements y.-u. > 0, i=l,2, and y, (t) > y9 (t) for all t during the sim-
4
ulation, it was necessary to choose negative y. and u. . The values are
A
y = -.045, y„ = -.03, u = -.066, u = -.05, which imply k' (t) < 0.
The second simulation runs for 40 years.
In the first simulation, the demolition age of buildings which never
undergo succession and are redeveloped for their original occupants is 9
years regardless of which group inhabits them. While more realistic
45-50 year lifespans can be generated by other parameter choices, short
building lives permitted relatively short simulations. Blocks 0-22 and
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57-65 never change hands in the first simulation, so all but blocks
and 65 from this group are omitted in Table 1, which contains selected
results from the first simulation. While the initial boundary between
the groups is k=25, group 2 has bid away group 1 dwellings out to block
34 by year 6. Table la shows the situation in year 8, where dwellings
out to block 44 have undergone succession. As predicted by the analysis
of Section II, only the innermost group 1 dwellings have been bid away.
In year 9, buildings which did not undergo succession are redeveloped,
while, as predicted by the analysis in Section II, redevelopment is de-
layed for those structures which were bid away from group 1. Table lb
shows that in year 10, buildings in blocks 47 and 48 are redeveloped
for the original group 1 inhabitants, while dwellings in blocks 26-46
continue to age beyond their normal redevelopment time and are still oc-
cupied by group 2. The implication of this phenomenon for the pattern
of land-use may be seen in the S* column. The smooth decline of build-
ing heights in the central part of the city is interrupted by a sharp
decrease at block 26, which is followed by a range of smoothly decreas-
ing heights that ends with an abrupt increase at block 46. This irregu-
lar building height pattern, which is graphed in Figure 1, could never
be generated by the static model.
Redevelopment of buildings in blocks 26-46, which proceeds in years
11-16, is complete by year 16, shown in Table Id. Table lc shows a
peculiar pocket of low intensity land use in blocks 30-32 in year 15,
where 15-year-old buildings still stand.
In year 18, succession begins again as group 2 bids away 9-year-old
buildings in blocks 49 and 50, preventing their redevelopment. By year
-16-
19, shown in Table le, those buildings have been redeveloped for group 1,
while group 2 has bid away the 8- and 9-year-old dwellings in blocks
44-48 and the 7-year-old units in block 42. These results bear out the
predictions of the above analysis because only the innermost units of
vintages which undergo succession are bid away. The striking feature
of Table 13, however, is the presence of members of group 2 deep within
the group 1 new-construction area, separated by many blocks from the
rest of their group. The static urban model, of course, fails to gen-
erate this realistic spatial mixing of income groups.
In years 20 and 21, shown in Tables If and lg, group 2 consolidates
its position in the group 1 new-construction area by filling in gaps left
by the residential leapfrogging of years 18 and 19. By year 28, rede-
velopment for group 1 has proceeded back to block 39, but members of
group 2 have again penetrated deeply into the group 1 area at blocks
50-51. The process of filling the gap starts again and is complete by
year 37 (see Tables li-lk) , at which time a new group 2 beachhead is
established at block 51. By year 45, two widely separated group 2
neighborhoods exist deep within the group 1 new-construction area (see
Tables ll and lm) . Finally, note the striking areas of low intensity
land-use in years 28 and 40, where neighborhoods of old buildings are
surrounded by much younger structures. Figure 1 shows the graph of S*
in year 28.
In the second simulation, the demolition ages of buildings which
never undergo succession and are redeveloped for the original group are
7 and 8 years for groups 1 and 2 respectively. Since the original
group 1 new-construction area is controlled by group 1 throughout the
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simulation, bloclcs 31-64 are omitted from Table 2. By year 7, shown in
Table 2a, group 1 has bid away group 2 dwellings in to block 16, and in
year 8, shown in Table 2b, redevelopment leaves a familiar cluster of
old buildings surrounded by new structures. The simultaneous redevelop-
ment of buildings in blocks 0-15 and blocks 16-18, which x^ere bid away
by group 2, appears to contradict the above analysis, but is in fact due
to the use of discrete time units. Table 2c shows the situation in year
14, where buildings which were redeveloped for group 2 are again bid
away by group 1. Note that while block 19 was jumped, it has been bid
away by year 15, shown in Table 2d. By year 17, shown in Table 2e,
buildings out to block 18 have been redeveloped for group 1, while a
group of old buildings in blocks 19-23 breaks the smooth contour of
building heights, as shown in Figure 2. The by now familiar cycle of
succession followed by redevelopment for group 1 followed by further
succession is evident in years 22, 26, 30, 36, and 37, shown in Tables
2f-2j , Note the leapfrogging by group 1 in years 22, 30, and 37, and
note the presence of a lone block of 8-year-old buildings surrounded
by new structures in year 35. The building height contour for this
year is shown in Figure 2.
V.
The simulations highlight the differences between static and dy-
namic two-class cities. First, both simulations show that the blurring
of the boundary between the two income groups is a natural outcome when
structures are durable. This result corresponds better to location
patterns in real cities than does the perfect segregation implied by
-18-
the static model. Second, postponement of demolition for buildings which
undergo residential succession generates pockets of low intensity land-
use which interrupt the smooth decline of the building height contour.
This implication is welcome in view of the complex patterns of building
heights found in real cities, which are often inexplicable under the
static model. In sum, the spatial vintage model developed in this paper
strengthens the link between reality and urban economic theory.
An important task for future research is the adaptation of the
model to a closed city, where utility is endogenous. Apparently, little
can be said in general about the dynamic properties of a closed urban
area, even in the one-class case; insights will have to be drawn prin-
cipally from simulation results. It appears, however, that the compu-
tational problems involved in closed city simulations will be substan-
tial. Less ambitious research goals might include use of the open city
model to analyse the effects of housing subsidy programs, changes in
zoning laws, or discontinuous changes in transportation costs. Such
studies would no doubt provide further insight into the dynamics of an
urban economy with durable structures.
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FIGURE 2.
Footnotes
The inverse relation between income and distance to the CBD
referred to in the introduction requires that marginal commuting costs
do not rise rapidly with income. The result that the group with the
higher y^/c^ ratio lives in the outer annulus at t=0 is a special case
of this general result.
2
F(t,T) = e(exp[u
2
(t-T)/6] - exp[u
1
(t-T)/0]).
exp[(a(l-6)/0 - y2)(t-x)]
3
M(t,x) = F(t,T)(u
02
/u
01 )
1/e
.exp[(u
2
-u
1
)T/e].exp[(y
2
-y
1
)(t-T)]
4
A peculiarity of the model is that xjhile the identity of the high
income group may change as time progresses because of differences in
rates of income growth, the location of new-construction areas is deter-
mined only by initial income levels when cm = c» 9 . This means that the
current income of the group whose new-construction area is an outer an-
nulus may be lower than that of the other group over parts of the city's
history, a result which is impossible in the static urban spatial model.
To avoid this unappealing outcome, we chose y.. and y„ so that
Y-, (t) > yo^t) over the time span of the simulations. Under this require-
ment and the constraint y. - u. > 0, ±=1,2, it was necessary to choose
negative y. and u. to generate residential succession in the group 2 area.
Although the unbroken parts of the curves in the figures should be
slightly concave, they are drawn as straight lines since the difference
is almost imperceptible.
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